A Rationality Larger Than The Material Universe by Massey, Irving
Criticism
Volume 50 | Issue 2 Article 11
2008
"A Rationality Larger Than The Material Universe"
Irving Massey
SUNY at Buffalo
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.wayne.edu/criticism
Recommended Citation
Massey, Irving (2008) ""A Rationality Larger Than The Material Universe"," Criticism: Vol. 50: Iss. 2, Article 11.
Available at: http://digitalcommons.wayne.edu/criticism/vol50/iss2/11
Criticism, Spring 2008, Vol. 50, No. 2, pp. 339–343. 






Coleridge and German Philosophy: 
The Poet in the Land of Logic 
by Paul Hamilton. London: 
Continuum, 2007. Pp. 192. 
$138.00 cloth.
Coleridge and the Crisis of Reason 
by Richard Berkeley. New York: 
Palgrave, 2007. Pp. 240. $69.95 
cloth.
Paul Hamilton’s book would do 
better as the subject of a seminar 
than of a review. It assumes a fresh 
reading, plus total recall, of Euro-
pean philosophy at least from Kant 
to Kierkegaard, as well as of all the 
relevant literary texts. It does not 
stoop to summary or explanation. 
In a word, it is not a book for the 
intellectually timid. One had better 
care deeply about the issues that it 
raises, because it places great de-
mands on a reader.
The abstract printed on the back 
cover of the book states a large part 
of Hamilton’s argument more clearly 
than the text itself does: “Coleridge’s 
infectious attachment to German 
(post-Kantian) philosophy was due 
to its symmetries with the structure 
of his Christian belief . . . Its com-
prehensiveness, however, rendered 
redundant further theological de-
scription, undermining the faith it 
had seemed to support.” It may be 
because of Coleridge’s devotion to 
German thought that his attach-
ment to Christianity, although obvi-
ously central to his life and work in 
one sense, seems at times in another 
sense only ancillary: an outrigger run-
ning in tandem with his philosophy. 
Despite his commitment to German 
philosophy, though, when Coleridge 
rebels against its all-inclusive style, 
he does seem to be craving an alter-
native that offers something more 
than either quasi-religion or mere 
talk about religion. This alternative 
emerges (perhaps somewhat arbi-
trarily) as institutional theism, a real 
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and conceptual structure that Cole-
ridge builds up gradually alongside 
his preoccupation with Continental 
philosophy. The growth of Cole-
ridge’s need for religion in this al-
most tangible sense is documented 
in the recent work by Donald M. 
Craig, Robert Southey and Romantic 
Apostasy, which has a substantial 
amount of material on Coleridge.
Coleridge’s rebellion against the 
sense of constriction created by the 
German philosophical frame may 
also be detected, according to Ham-
ilton, in what he calls the “mystery 
poems,” “The Rime of the Ancient 
Mariner,” “Kubla Khan,” and 
“Chris tabel,” all of which fl irt with 
a major transgression. Perhaps in 
these poems divinity itself has as-
sumed a transgressive form (56). 
Whether or not Coleridge later re-
pudiated this element in the poems 
(52), their resolutely unfi nished—or, 
one might say, unfi nishable—quality 
clearly does keep them outside any 
hermetic philosophic system. (Whe-
ther they are much more compatible 
with orthodox Christianity than 
with German philosophy is another 
question.) In his conclusion, in fact, 
Hamilton follows Coleridge in ar-
guing against any closed, terminable, 
self-suffi cient poetry.
Hamilton’s last chapter, “Spelling 
the World,” is a tour de force. It opens 
with a section titled “The Mammalo-
schen,” or “mother tongue.” In Yid-
dish, the word “mammeloschen” 
refers to Yiddish itself. Here it 
serves to introduce an astonishing 
passage in Coleridge about a child’s 
emergence into consciousness, into 
language, and into an awareness of 
God, through its interaction with its 
mother. The child literally spells its 
world into being as it begins to iden-
tify its mother (121).
One of the respects in which Cole-
ridge found systematic German 
philosophy inadequate was in its 
failure to acknowledge the central-
ity of personal affect. Once more, 
the infant-mother relationship is the 
touchstone, and the model, again, is 
language. The sounds of a word are 
liable to fall apart; the word can lose 
its meaning, even vanish, until we 
can “touch” it again; so a child in the 
dark will sometimes cry, “I am not 
here, touch me, mother, that I may 
be here!” (128). Human touch is a 
prerequisite for reality, meaning, 
and identity.
In the end, though, Hamilton 
does call on a different aspect of 
German philosophy to support an-
other Coleridgean view—namely, 
that the aesthetic cannot be a fi nal 
value. (If I understand him cor-
rectly, Hamilton imputes the oppo-
site view to Wordsworth.) This is 
an important point, since one can 
often feel that Coleridge is an almost-
failed poet, or a poet malgré lui; al-
ternatively, that his poetry sits 
uneasily among his fl oods of philo-
sophical or autobiographical prose: 
that one can’t really tell where it fi ts 
in, or whether it fi ts at all. If, on the 
other hand, poetry is only one of the 
forms in which larger human expre-
ssion fi nds its articulation, in which 
poetry is only a name for a certain 
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part of mental breathing, so to speak, 
then Coleridge’s poetry and prose do 
fi t together. “The Jena idea of poetry, 
as Walter Benjamin famously stated, 
was prose, a much wider practice 
than any literary establishment might 
encompass, and something with a 
place for each of us” (138).
This is a book to tease, or tor-
ment, one into thought.
Ambitious as Hamilton’s book is, its 
ambition is more than matched by 
that of Richard Berkeley’s. Hamil-
ton’s work is much livelier and more 
engaging; Berkeley’s is more sys-
tematic, even pedantic, in pursuing 
the nuances of Coleridge’s opinions 
about German philosophy. It is only 
gradually that one realizes what is 
at stake: not really Coleridge’s opin-
ions about anything, but the nature 
of truth itself. Berkeley confronts 
what one might choose to identify 
as the second most important prob-
lem in philosophy, after the nature 
of consciousness—namely, whether 
reason is a natural or (at least in some 
sense) a supernatural phenomenon.
Berkeley’s title may sound gran-
diloquent and vague until one real-
izes that the author is in fact trying 
to deal with the essential nature of 
reason. Berkeley claims that for 
Coleridge, “[R]eason is not a human 
activity, rather it is something exter-
nal to which human beings stand in 
relation. Thus Coleridge describes 
reason as ‘the super individual of each 
man by which he is man’ ” (190). Sim-
ilarly, Friedrich Jacobi says, “[I]f we 
understand by reason, the principle 
of cognition in general, then it is the 
spirit, out of which the whole living 
nature of man is made . . . he is a 
form that it has taken on” (190–91). 
A collapse into pantheism, then, 
carried, for Coleridge, “not merely 
the threat of atheism and fatalism, it 
also carried the far more pervasive 
threat of the collapse of reason it-
self” (161). For Coleridge, “this brink 
[the brink of pantheism] signals not 
so much a descent into an unaccept-
able ontology as the implosion of 
the rational self, or of reason itself” 
(162).
Why should this be? It may be 
helpful to translate the problem into 
simpler contemporary terms. Let us 
assume that the conclusion that 2 + 
2 = 4 is the product of physical ac-
tivity in our neurons. If this is true, 
then there is no reason why the same 
neurons might not yield a different 
result: say, 2 + 2 = 5, or 25. There is 
no one (other than some other pro-
cess similarly grounded in matter 
itself, some other electrochemical 
mechanism) to evaluate the out-
come or to determine its validity. In 
other words, if reason is a purely 
physical process, there is no judge 
or referee to be found anywhere to 
appraise its results. Even by pointing 
out that it is fi nally our physiology 
that puts us in a position to reach a 
rational conclusion, or any conclu-
sion at all, we would not be altering 
the case: our physical existence may 
be an essential condition for rational-
ity, but it cannot dictate or ratify the 
conclusion itself. Without subscrib-
ing to the anthropic principle, one 
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could legitimately quote the cosmol-
ogist John Barrow here: there has to 
be “a rationality larger than the ma-
terial universe” (cited by Jonathan 
Taylor, Science and Omniscience in 
Nineteenth-Century Literature [Brigh-
ton, Eng.: Sussex Academic Press, 
2007], 51).
This is, apparently, the “crisis of 
reason” that Coleridge was strug-
gling to avoid. If pantheism or Spi-
nozism (or some other system that 
implied that reason was rooted in 
the physical processes of the uni-
verse) were to prevail, then all would 
go dark in the chamber of Coleridge’s 
mind.
Berkeley has no hesitation in at-
taching some passages in Coleridge’s 
most important poems directly 
to this anxiety. “And what if all of 
animated nature / Be but organic 
Harps diversely fram’d, / That 
tremble into thought, as o’er them 
sweeps, / Plastic and vast, one in-
tellectual Breeze, / At once the 
Soul of each, and God of all?” 
(16–17). Even this wording, achieved 
after much struggle (17), leaves one 
in the same basic quandary: if the di-
vine affl atus were not there, or only 
intermittently there (as in “Frost at 
Midnight”), one would immedi-
ately be engulfed by silence and 
blank solitude. All depends, then, 
on being assured of a reliable, even 
if sometimes only potential, divine 
presence. Worst of all, of course, 
would be the possibility that the ma-
terialist interpretation is right, and 
that the wind is not God’s breath at 
all, but just the physical movement 
of the air. Then, without divinity, 
we would lose our individuality and 
our identity, and our very (pun in-
tended) “raison d’être.” “[I]f the 
breeze is everything, then the harp’s 
tune can have no meaning” (210).
“[T]he speculations of The Eolian 
Harp lead inexorably to the con-
trasted horrors of the supernatural 
poetry: the existential blankness of 
The Ancient Mariner and the intru-
sive alien other of Christabel that 
reduces will to automatism” (209). 
In fact, one might say of Christabel 
that it not only denies the freedom 
of the will, but that it also illustrates 
the mechanism by which panthe-
ism (taken here as a variety of mate-
rialism) subverts free will: Christabel, 
becoming snakelike, becomes part 
of nature, which, in turn, imposes 
its automatisms upon human be-
havior. She is threatened by, or indeed 
comes to exemplify, “the extinction of 
rational self-understanding” (209). 
“Throughout Coleridge’s poetry 
and philosophy the predicament of 
human subjectivity and rationality 
is the key issue, so that the Eolian 
harp has a hidden signifi cance for 
his entire intellectual life” (209–10).
Berkeley arrives at these conclu-
sions only after extraordinary efforts. 
He studies Coleridge’s marginalia 
on the German philosophers in ex-
haustive detail, undaunted by the 
confusions, self-contradictions, and 
misinterpretations, not to mention 
the frequently incoherent plagia-
risms, that riddle Coleridge’s texts. 
It seems fair to say that between 
them Paul Hamilton and Richard 
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Berkeley have added new dimen-
sions to the canonical work of 
Thomas McFarland on Coleridge.
Reading through a series of 
scholarly works in sequence, one 
fi nds certain distinctions and group-
ings forming naturally in one’s 
mind. One major division in this 
taxonomy lies between books that 
are written about something and 
books that are written for something. 
Both of these books, but especially 
the Berkeley book, fall in the latter 
category. Though modest in its stated 
intention—namely, to elucidate a 
confl ict in Coleridge’s thinking—
Coleridge and the Crisis of Reason 
forces one to confront a crucial 
problem in philosophy on its own 
terms.
—SUNY at Buffalo

